On Conceiving the Inconsistent

Francesco Berto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus counterfactual conditionals, the closest worlds are relevantly closest belief-worlds: closest to how things are believed to be, rather than to how they are. Also, closeness takes into account apriority and the opacity of intentional contexts.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)103-121
Number of pages19
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Volume114
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014
EventMeeting of the Aristotelian Society : 2013 - Senate House, University of London, London, United Kingdom
Duration: 2 Dec 2013 → …

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Ceteris Paribus
Impossible Worlds
Operator
Closeness
Possible Worlds
Quantifiers
Conceivability
Logic
Counterfactual Conditionals
Closure
Opacity

Cite this

On Conceiving the Inconsistent. / Berto, Francesco.

In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 114, No. 1, 04.2014, p. 103-121.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Berto, Francesco. / On Conceiving the Inconsistent. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2014 ; Vol. 114, No. 1. pp. 103-121.
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