Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractarian picture of logic rules out any conception of that subject as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', however, some conception of logic survives even on Wittgenstein's later view. At the same time, his rejection of conceptions of philosophical theory as explanatory seems to force Wittgenstein into descriptivism. Here I argue that despite these constraints a valuable, normative account of logic consistent with Wittgenstein's critique can be identified. That possibility naturally raises a further question: can any conception of formal logic as valuable modulo natural language survive Wittgenstein's later change of heart? Again, I argue for a positive response and propose a formal framework in terms of which analogues of inferential structures (both traditional and non-traditional) can be constructed. Hence the claim that the system in question constitutes a framework for a logic of natural discourse.
|Title of host publication||In: Critical Studies (16), Language - Meaning - Social Construction Interdisciplinary Studies (eds. Grant,C. B.;McLaughlin,D.), Rodopi,B. V., Amsterdam-New York|
|Place of Publication||In: Critical Studies (16), Language - Meaning - Social Construction Interdisciplinary Studies (eds. Grant,C. B.;McLaughlin,D.), Rodopi,B. V., Amsterdam-New York|
|Number of pages||20|
|Publication status||Published - 2001|