Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg, Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debatepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010), Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1081-1083
Number of pages3
JournalConsciousness and Cognition
Volume19
Issue number4
Early online date8 Jun 2010
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2010

Keywords

  • consciousness
  • methodology
  • perceptual awareness scale
  • confidence ratings
  • post-decision wagering
  • subliminal perception
  • partial awareness

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