Peer pressure: Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment

Han-Xin Yang, Zhi-Xi Wu, Zhihai Rong, Ying-Cheng Lai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.
Original languageEnglish
Article number022121
Number of pages6
JournalPhysical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics
Volume91
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Feb 2015

Fingerprint

Enhancement
augmentation
games
Evolution of Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Evolutionary Game
Simulation Analysis
Open Problems
Theoretical Analysis
Symmetry
Interaction
Strategy
symmetry
simulation
interactions
Model

Keywords

  • Peer pressure
  • Mutual punishment
  • Cooperation

Cite this

Peer pressure : Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment. / Yang, Han-Xin; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Rong, Zhihai; Lai, Ying-Cheng.

In: Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 91, 022121, 17.02.2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{142c90a3dad44ecbaf8f79b380240f8a,
title = "Peer pressure: Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment",
abstract = "An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.",
keywords = "Peer pressure, Mutual punishment, Cooperation",
author = "Han-Xin Yang and Zhi-Xi Wu and Zhihai Rong and Ying-Cheng Lai",
note = "ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No. 61403083, No. 11135001, No. 11475074 and No. 61473060, and the Research Foundation of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China and Hong Kong Scholars Program (No. XJ2013019 and G-YZ4D). Y.C.L. was supported by the Army Research Office (ARO) under Grant No. W911NF-14-1-0504.",
year = "2015",
month = "2",
day = "17",
doi = "10.1103/PhysRevE.91.022121",
language = "English",
volume = "91",
journal = "Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics",
issn = "1539-3755",
publisher = "AMER PHYSICAL SOC",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Peer pressure

T2 - Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment

AU - Yang, Han-Xin

AU - Wu, Zhi-Xi

AU - Rong, Zhihai

AU - Lai, Ying-Cheng

N1 - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No. 61403083, No. 11135001, No. 11475074 and No. 61473060, and the Research Foundation of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China and Hong Kong Scholars Program (No. XJ2013019 and G-YZ4D). Y.C.L. was supported by the Army Research Office (ARO) under Grant No. W911NF-14-1-0504.

PY - 2015/2/17

Y1 - 2015/2/17

N2 - An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

AB - An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

KW - Peer pressure

KW - Mutual punishment

KW - Cooperation

U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.91.022121

DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.91.022121

M3 - Article

VL - 91

JO - Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics

JF - Physical Review. E, Statistical, Nonlinear and Soft Matter Physics

SN - 1539-3755

M1 - 022121

ER -