Personnel Decisions, Wage Profiles and Investment in Firms

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

An investment model where firms mitigate adverse hold-up effects using hiring and personnel policies is theoretically investigated and empirically scrutinized. While no evidence for the prediction of differing worker characteristics, other than gender, across firms is found, demand (firm) side factors are evident in the hiring process. Evidence on other personnel policies is consistent with theory, which predicts firms with high-investment expenditures resist unions, utilize more temporary and shift-time workers and conduct more multitask training. Wages in high-investment firms are higher, more sensitive to unemployment and experience variables that exhibit greater effects than in low-investment firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)742-766
Number of pages25
JournalBritish Journal of Industrial Relations
Volume49
Issue number4
Early online date3 Jun 2011
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2011

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Wages
Personnel
Wage profile
Firm investment
Hiring
Workers
Personnel policy

Cite this

Personnel Decisions, Wage Profiles and Investment in Firms. / Skatun, John Douglas Fordyce; Theodossiou, Ioannis.

In: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 49, No. 4, 12.2011, p. 742-766.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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