Pluralist Theories of Truth

Douglas Owain Edwards

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Abstract

Truth pluralism (or ‘alethic’ pluralism) is a view about the nature of truth. Broadly speaking, the thought behind the view is that truth may require different treatments for different kinds of subject matter. In particular, there is the prospect for it to be consistent to conceive of truth in a realist manner for discourse about the material world, while maintaining an anti-realist notion of truth for discourse about subjects that are perhaps more mind-dependent in character, such as discourse about ethics or comedy. Contemporary pluralist theories of truth have their roots in William James’s pragmatism. The literature on truth pluralism is expanding rapidly; new avenues of research on the subject are constantly being explored. This article introduces the central motivations, frameworks, and problems for the view which have preoccupied much of the discussion to date in contemporary analytic philosophy. Part 1 gives a brief history of some of the main inspirations behind the views outlined in contemporary debates. Part 2 goes through some preliminary issues. Part 3 outlines one of the main motivations for truth pluralism. Part 4 details the main formulations of the view that have been offered, and discusses the problems each formulation faces. Finally, Part 5 discusses some concerns about the general approach of the view.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
EditorsJames Fieser, Bradley Dowden
PublisherUniversity of Tennessee at Martin
ISBN (Electronic)2161-0002
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Fingerprint

Theory of Truth
Pluralist
Pluralism
Discourse
Anti-realist
History
Subject Matter
Material World
Thought
Pragmatism
Realist
Comedy
Alethic Pluralism
Analytic philosophy

Cite this

Edwards, D. O. (2012). Pluralist Theories of Truth. In J. Fieser, & B. Dowden (Eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy University of Tennessee at Martin.

Pluralist Theories of Truth. / Edwards, Douglas Owain.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ed. / James Fieser; Bradley Dowden. University of Tennessee at Martin, 2012.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionary

Edwards, DO 2012, Pluralist Theories of Truth. in J Fieser & B Dowden (eds), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. University of Tennessee at Martin.
Edwards DO. Pluralist Theories of Truth. In Fieser J, Dowden B, editors, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. University of Tennessee at Martin. 2012
Edwards, Douglas Owain. / Pluralist Theories of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. editor / James Fieser ; Bradley Dowden. University of Tennessee at Martin, 2012.
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