Power-Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Abstract

To achieve peaceful interethnic relations and a stable democracy in the aftermath of violent conflict, institutional designers may task political elites representing previously warring sides with governing a nation together. In Power-Sharing Executives, Joanne McEvoy asks whether certain institutional rules can promote cooperation between political parties representing the contending groups in a deeply divided place. Examining the different experiences of postconflict power sharing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland, she finds that with certain incentives and norms in place, power sharing can indeed provide political space for an atmosphere of joint governance or accommodation between groups. Power-Sharing Executives explains how the institutional design process originated and evolved in each of the three nations and investigates the impact of institutional rules on interethnic cooperation. McEvoy also looks at the role of external actors such as international organizations in persuading political elites to agree to share power and to implement power-sharing peace agreements. This comparative analysis of institutional formation and outcomes shows how coalitions of varying inclusivity or with different rules can bring about a successful if delicate consociationality in practice. Power-Sharing Executives offers prescriptions for policymakers facing the challenges of mediating peace in a postconflict society and sheds light on the wider study of peace promotion.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationPhiladelphia, P.A.
PublisherUniversity of Pennsylvania Press
Number of pages288
ISBN (Print)0812246519, 978-0812246513
Publication statusPublished - 13 Oct 2014

Publication series

NameNational and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century

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