Choosing actions within norm-regulated environments involves balancing achieving one's goals and coping with any penalties for non-compliant behaviour. This choice becomes more complicated in environments where there is uncertainty. In this paper, we address the question of choosing actions in environments where there is uncertainty regarding both the outcomes of agent actions and the intensity of monitoring for norm violations. Our technique assumes no prior knowledge of probabilities over action outcomes or the likelihood of norm violations being detected by employing reinforcement learning to discover both the dynamics of the environment and the effectiveness of the enforcer. Results indicate agents become aware of greater rewards for violations when enforcement is lax, which gradually become less attractive as the enforcement is increased.
|Title of host publication||Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems XI. |
|Subtitle of host publication||COIN 2015|
|Number of pages||15|
|Publication status||Published - May 2015|
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|