Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Bruno Yun; Srdjan Vesic; Nir Oren

Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

Original language	English
Publisher	ArXiv
Pages	1-12
Number of pages	12
Publication status	Submitted - 19 Jun 2020

Keywords

cs.AI
cs.GT
Argumentation
Game theory
Nash equilibrium
Pure strategy

Access to Document

https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.11020Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

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