Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Bruno Yun* (Corresponding Author), Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
Original languageEnglish
JournalArgument and Computation
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 3 Jun 2021

Keywords

  • cs.AI
  • cs.GT
  • Argumentation
  • Game theory
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Pure strategy

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