Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Bruno Yun; Srdjan Vesic; Nir Oren

Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Bruno Yun^* (Corresponding Author), Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

Original language	English
Journal	Argument and Computation
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 3 Jun 2021

Keywords

cs.AI
cs.GT
Argumentation
Game theory
Nash equilibrium
Pure strategy

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https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.11020Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

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title = "Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation",

abstract = " In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user. ",

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author = "Bruno Yun and Srdjan Vesic and Nir Oren",

year = "2021",

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language = "English",

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AU - Vesic, Srdjan

AU - Oren, Nir

PY - 2021/6/3

Y1 - 2021/6/3

N2 - In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

AB - In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

KW - cs.AI

KW - cs.GT

KW - Argumentation

KW - Game theory

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Pure strategy

M3 - Article

JO - Argument and Computation

JF - Argument and Computation

SN - 1946-2166

ER -

Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Abstract

Keywords

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Cite this