Risk Taking in Selection Contests

Hans Krogh Hvide, E. G. Kristiansen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

49 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study contests where the strategic variable is the degree of risk taking rather than the amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; by having a small number of contestants, and by restricting contestant quality. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)172-179
Number of pages7
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume42
Issue number42
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Keywords

  • contest
  • risk taking
  • selection
  • tournament
  • TOURNAMENTS
  • INCENTIVES

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