Abstract
We study a simple model in which a monopolist supplies a multi-attribute good and
does not know whether the consumer is an expected-utility maximizer or a boundedly rational type that follows the satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon. We find that unless the probability of the consumer being fully rational is sufficiently high, the fact that the boundedly rational consumer never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives implies that she never ends up with an alternative strictly better than her aspiration levels.
does not know whether the consumer is an expected-utility maximizer or a boundedly rational type that follows the satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon. We find that unless the probability of the consumer being fully rational is sufficiently high, the fact that the boundedly rational consumer never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives implies that she never ends up with an alternative strictly better than her aspiration levels.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 385-389 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
Volume | 66 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 31 Aug 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2013 |