Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske’s Theory of Knowledge

Christoph Jaeger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to Fred Dretske’s externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske’s epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment. I argue that, given Dretske’s construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. This has far-reaching consequences. For if it is true that, as Dretske also believes, accepting closure leads to skepticism, he must either embrace skepticism or abandon his information theory of knowledge. The latter alternative would seem to be preferable. But taking this route would deprive one of the most powerfully developed externalist epistemologies of its foundation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-201
Number of pages15
JournalErkenntnis
Volume61
Issue number2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2004

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Closure
Epistemology
Closed
Information Theory
If and only if
Knowledge
Theory of Knowledge
Skepticism
Alternatives
Entailment
Externalist
Logic
Denial
Route
Construal

Cite this

Skepticism, Information, and Closure : Dretske’s Theory of Knowledge. / Jaeger, Christoph.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 61, No. 2-3, 11.2004, p. 187-201.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Jaeger, Christoph. / Skepticism, Information, and Closure : Dretske’s Theory of Knowledge. In: Erkenntnis. 2004 ; Vol. 61, No. 2-3. pp. 187-201.
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