Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism

Patrick Bernhagen, T. Bräuninger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

60 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)43-64
Number of pages21
JournalPolitical Studies
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2005

Keywords

  • INFORMATION
  • STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE
  • BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
  • LOBBYING
  • INFLUENCE

Cite this

Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism. / Bernhagen, Patrick; Bräuninger, T.

In: Political Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, 03.2005, p. 43-64.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bernhagen, Patrick ; Bräuninger, T. / Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism. In: Political Studies. 2005 ; Vol. 53, No. 1. pp. 43-64.
@article{474b4e931f0942fb8966c3fd37646be9,
title = "Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism",
abstract = "This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.",
keywords = "INFORMATION, STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE, BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, LOBBYING, INFLUENCE",
author = "Patrick Bernhagen and T. Br{\"a}uninger",
year = "2005",
month = "3",
doi = "10.1111/J.1467-9248.2005.00516.X",
language = "English",
volume = "53",
pages = "43--64",
journal = "Political Studies",
issn = "0032-3217",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism

AU - Bernhagen, Patrick

AU - Bräuninger, T.

PY - 2005/3

Y1 - 2005/3

N2 - This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.

AB - This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.

KW - INFORMATION

KW - STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE

KW - BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

KW - LOBBYING

KW - INFLUENCE

U2 - 10.1111/J.1467-9248.2005.00516.X

DO - 10.1111/J.1467-9248.2005.00516.X

M3 - Article

VL - 53

SP - 43

EP - 64

JO - Political Studies

JF - Political Studies

SN - 0032-3217

IS - 1

ER -