Abstract
A number of countries are considering, mainly as part of their obligations under current treaties, domestic actions to internalize the social cost of pollution. One of the major obstacles, however, in those countries is the fear of jeopardizing their competitive position in world markets. A policy that has been repeatedly proposed to deal with this challenge is a tariff mitigating any distortions arising from cross-country differences in environmental policy. Such unilateral actions are the focus of this paper. It is argued that if a country set its pollution taxes optimally, cooperatively or non-cooperatively, there exist unilateral tariff reforms that improve global welfare.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-25 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | Agricultural Economics Review |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - 31 Dec 2016 |
Keywords
- environmental taxation
- tariff reforms
- BTAs
- international trade
- Pareto efficiency
- Pareto improving reforms
- climate change