Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit (or Excess)

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Abstract

Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearer H when H gives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with due credibility exists. I show that if it is denied that ultimately these cases exemplify testimonial injustice without credibility deficit, then either they must be taken to exemplify a novel kind of epistemic, non-testimonial injustice, or they bring to light a significant exegetical result.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-211
Number of pages9
JournalThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volume5
Issue number3
Early online date25 Jul 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2016

Keywords

  • testimonial injustice
  • epistemic injustice
  • Miranda Fricker
  • mansplaining
  • credibility deficit
  • due credibility

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