Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearer H when H gives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with due credibility exists. I show that if it is denied that ultimately these cases exemplify testimonial injustice without credibility deficit, then either they must be taken to exemplify a novel kind of epistemic, non-testimonial injustice, or they bring to light a significant exegetical result.
|Number of pages||9|
|Journal||Thought: A Journal of Philosophy|
|Early online date||25 Jul 2016|
|Publication status||Published - Sep 2016|
- testimonial injustice
- epistemic injustice
- Miranda Fricker
- credibility deficit
- due credibility
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- School of Divinity, History & Philosophy, Philosophy - Senior Lecturer