The Impact of Turnout on Turning Up: Complementarity of Attendance among Co-Workers.

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5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of complementarities in work attendance on absenteeism. It investigates the case where workers, who turn up for work, cover the workload of absent colleagues. Thus, externalities arise from workers being absent from work. The effort workers exert in the workplace is negatively related to worker turnout. Attendance levels of workers are strategic complements, as workers are more likely to turn up when turnout is high. Firms increase wages and improve working conditions in response. In contrast to the more standard shirking literature, the firm sets employment levels higher. Workers may benefit from draconian firing rules.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)225-242
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economics
Volume83
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Keywords

  • attendance
  • absenteeism
  • shirking models
  • WORKING TIME
  • ABSENTEEISM
  • WAGES
  • MODEL
  • UNEMPLOYMENT
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • SHIRKING
  • WORKERS

Cite this

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title = "The Impact of Turnout on Turning Up: Complementarity of Attendance among Co-Workers.",
abstract = "This paper studies the effects of complementarities in work attendance on absenteeism. It investigates the case where workers, who turn up for work, cover the workload of absent colleagues. Thus, externalities arise from workers being absent from work. The effort workers exert in the workplace is negatively related to worker turnout. Attendance levels of workers are strategic complements, as workers are more likely to turn up when turnout is high. Firms increase wages and improve working conditions in response. In contrast to the more standard shirking literature, the firm sets employment levels higher. Workers may benefit from draconian firing rules.",
keywords = "attendance, absenteeism, shirking models, WORKING TIME, ABSENTEEISM, WAGES, MODEL, UNEMPLOYMENT, EQUILIBRIUM, SHIRKING, WORKERS",
author = "Diane Skatun and Skatun, {John Douglas Fordyce}",
year = "2004",
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N2 - This paper studies the effects of complementarities in work attendance on absenteeism. It investigates the case where workers, who turn up for work, cover the workload of absent colleagues. Thus, externalities arise from workers being absent from work. The effort workers exert in the workplace is negatively related to worker turnout. Attendance levels of workers are strategic complements, as workers are more likely to turn up when turnout is high. Firms increase wages and improve working conditions in response. In contrast to the more standard shirking literature, the firm sets employment levels higher. Workers may benefit from draconian firing rules.

AB - This paper studies the effects of complementarities in work attendance on absenteeism. It investigates the case where workers, who turn up for work, cover the workload of absent colleagues. Thus, externalities arise from workers being absent from work. The effort workers exert in the workplace is negatively related to worker turnout. Attendance levels of workers are strategic complements, as workers are more likely to turn up when turnout is high. Firms increase wages and improve working conditions in response. In contrast to the more standard shirking literature, the firm sets employment levels higher. Workers may benefit from draconian firing rules.

KW - attendance

KW - absenteeism

KW - shirking models

KW - WORKING TIME

KW - ABSENTEEISM

KW - WAGES

KW - MODEL

KW - UNEMPLOYMENT

KW - EQUILIBRIUM

KW - SHIRKING

KW - WORKERS

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EP - 242

JO - Journal of Economics

JF - Journal of Economics

SN - 0931-8658

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ER -