Abstract
Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 150-167 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | American Journal of Political Science |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2005 |
Keywords
- CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
- CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
- MARKET-STRUCTURE
- ELECTORAL-PROCESS
- ACTION COMMITTEES
- PARTICIPATION
- DETERMINANTS
- BUSINESS
- FIRMS
- GOVERNMENT
Cite this
The Logic of Private and Collective Action. / Mitchell, Neil James; Hansen, W. L.; Drope, J.
In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 1, 01.2005, p. 150-167.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Logic of Private and Collective Action
AU - Mitchell, Neil James
AU - Hansen, W. L.
AU - Drope, J.
PY - 2005/1
Y1 - 2005/1
N2 - Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation.
AB - Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation.
KW - CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
KW - CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
KW - MARKET-STRUCTURE
KW - ELECTORAL-PROCESS
KW - ACTION COMMITTEES
KW - PARTICIPATION
KW - DETERMINANTS
KW - BUSINESS
KW - FIRMS
KW - GOVERNMENT
M3 - Article
VL - 49
SP - 150
EP - 167
JO - American Journal of Political Science
JF - American Journal of Political Science
SN - 0092-5853
IS - 1
ER -