The Nigerian resolution framework for domestic systemically important banks: a reconsideration of the public bail-out model and procedural safeguards

Chike Emedosi* (Corresponding Author)

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This article reviews the extent to which Nigeria’s resolution framework for domestic systemically important banks adopts the Financial Stability Board’s bail-in principles and procedural safeguards. It demonstrates that, despite its enhanced resolution powers, the Nigerian resolution framework is still inherently based on a public bail-out system and the exercise of resolution powers remains exposed to judicial interruptions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)502 - 513
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Company and Commercial Law Review
Volume30
Issue number9
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Data Availability Statement

No data availability statement.

Keywords

  • bail-in
  • banking supervision
  • BANKS
  • liquidation
  • Nigeria
  • special resolution regime
  • systemically important financial institutions

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