The ontological status of minimal entities

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)97-114
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume141
Issue number1
Early online date12 Aug 2008
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2008

Fingerprint

Ontological
Entity
Language
Realist
Quantifiers

Keywords

  • Minimalism
  • Minimal entities
  • Properties
  • Facts
  • Internal quantification
  • Deflationary existence
  • Horwich
  • Hofweber
  • Schiffer

Cite this

The ontological status of minimal entities. / Moretti, Luca.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 141, No. 1, 10.2008, p. 97-114.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{a9fe689c62e843b39c39c06f3911f0af,
title = "The ontological status of minimal entities",
abstract = "Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.",
keywords = "Minimalism , Minimal entities , Properties , Facts, Internal quantification , Deflationary existence , Horwich , Hofweber , Schiffer",
author = "Luca Moretti",
year = "2008",
month = "10",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-008-9265-6",
language = "English",
volume = "141",
pages = "97--114",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The ontological status of minimal entities

AU - Moretti, Luca

PY - 2008/10

Y1 - 2008/10

N2 - Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.

AB - Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.

KW - Minimalism

KW - Minimal entities

KW - Properties

KW - Facts

KW - Internal quantification

KW - Deflationary existence

KW - Horwich

KW - Hofweber

KW - Schiffer

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-008-9265-6

DO - 10.1007/s11098-008-9265-6

M3 - Article

VL - 141

SP - 97

EP - 114

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 1

ER -