The problem of true-true counterfactuals

Aidan McGlynn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can take our intuitions about these examples at face value without any major departure from Lewis's approach to counterfactuals.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)276-285
Number of pages10
JournalAnalysis
Volume72
Issue number2
Early online date22 Feb 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2012

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Intuition
Verdict
Truth Conditions
David Lewis
Commentators
Consequent
Departure

Cite this

The problem of true-true counterfactuals. / McGlynn, Aidan.

In: Analysis, Vol. 72, No. 2, 04.2012, p. 276-285.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

McGlynn, Aidan. / The problem of true-true counterfactuals. In: Analysis. 2012 ; Vol. 72, No. 2. pp. 276-285.
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