Abstract
Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can take our intuitions about these examples at face value without any major departure from Lewis's approach to counterfactuals.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 276-285 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Analysis |
Volume | 72 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 22 Feb 2012 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2012 |