The tacking by disjunction paradox

Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism

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3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes [1998, Erkenntnis 49, 1–20] and Kuipers [2000, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Kluwer, Dordrecht] are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115-138
Number of pages24
JournalErkenntnis
Volume64
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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The tacking by disjunction paradox : Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism . / Moretti, Luca.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2006, p. 115-138.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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