Abstract
We investigate whether and how a change in performance-related payment motivated General Practitioners (GPs) in Scotland. We evaluate the effect of increases in the performance thresholds required for maximum payment under the Quality and Outcomes Framework in April 2006. A difference-in-differences estimator with fixed effects was employed to examine the number of patients treated under clinical indicators whose payment schedules were revised and to compare these with the figures for those indicators whose schedules remained unchanged. The results suggest that the increase in the maximum performance thresholds increased GPs' performance by 1.77% on average. Low-performing GPs improved significantly more (13.22%) than their high-performing counterparts (0.24%). Changes to maximum performance thresholds are differentially effective in incentivising GPs and could be used further to raise GPs' performance across all indicators
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 353-371 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Health Economics |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 5 Jan 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2015 |
Keywords
- financial incentives
- quality and outcomes framework
- general practitioners
Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The Tougher the Better: An Economic Analysis of Increased Payment Thresholds on the Performance of General Practices'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
Profiles
-
Shelley Farrar
- School of Medicine, Medical Sciences & Nutrition, Health Economics Research Unit - Research Fellow
- Public Health, Health Services and Primary Care
- Institute of Applied Health Sciences
Person: Academic Related - Research