The Wretchedness of Belief

Robert Christopher Plant

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" 14 thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist-relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of "genuine" religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that "ought implies can." In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)449-476
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Religious Ethics
Volume32
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Keywords

  • Wittgenstein
  • guilt
  • religion
  • ethics of belief

Cite this

The Wretchedness of Belief. / Plant, Robert Christopher.

In: Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, p. 449-476.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Plant, Robert Christopher. / The Wretchedness of Belief. In: Journal of Religious Ethics. 2004 ; Vol. 32, No. 3. pp. 449-476.
@article{f83eb912cd3640d1bf9acecb978537e8,
title = "The Wretchedness of Belief",
abstract = "In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly {"}religious man{"} 14 thinks himself to be, not merely {"}imperfect{"} or {"}ill,{"} but wholly {"}wretched.{"} While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist-relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of {"}genuine{"} religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that {"}ought implies can.{"} In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.",
keywords = "Wittgenstein, guilt, religion, ethics of belief",
author = "Plant, {Robert Christopher}",
year = "2004",
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-9795.2004.00174.x",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "449--476",
journal = "Journal of Religious Ethics",
issn = "0384-9694",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Wretchedness of Belief

AU - Plant, Robert Christopher

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" 14 thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist-relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of "genuine" religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that "ought implies can." In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.

AB - In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" 14 thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist-relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of "genuine" religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that "ought implies can." In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.

KW - Wittgenstein

KW - guilt

KW - religion

KW - ethics of belief

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2004.00174.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2004.00174.x

M3 - Article

VL - 32

SP - 449

EP - 476

JO - Journal of Religious Ethics

JF - Journal of Religious Ethics

SN - 0384-9694

IS - 3

ER -