Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling

Nicholas J Feltovich, R. Harbaugh, T. To

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

91 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal, or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignalling itself is a signal of confidence that separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)630-649
Number of pages19
JournalThe RAND Journal of Economics
Volume33
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2002

Keywords

  • signaling games
  • selection

Cite this

Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. / Feltovich, Nicholas J; Harbaugh, R.; To, T.

In: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 4, 11.2002, p. 630-649.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Feltovich, NJ, Harbaugh, R & To, T 2002, 'Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling', The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 630-649. https://doi.org/10.2307/3087478
Feltovich, Nicholas J ; Harbaugh, R. ; To, T. / Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling. In: The RAND Journal of Economics. 2002 ; Vol. 33, No. 4. pp. 630-649.
@article{8dc2ffdbba9b41949eb508cf1e2122d5,
title = "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling",
abstract = "In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal, or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignalling itself is a signal of confidence that separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.",
keywords = "signaling games, selection",
author = "Feltovich, {Nicholas J} and R. Harbaugh and T. To",
year = "2002",
month = "11",
doi = "10.2307/3087478",
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "630--649",
journal = "The RAND Journal of Economics",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling

AU - Feltovich, Nicholas J

AU - Harbaugh, R.

AU - To, T.

PY - 2002/11

Y1 - 2002/11

N2 - In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal, or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignalling itself is a signal of confidence that separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.

AB - In signalling environments ranging from consumption to education, high-quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower-quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal, or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignalling itself is a signal of confidence that separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.

KW - signaling games

KW - selection

U2 - 10.2307/3087478

DO - 10.2307/3087478

M3 - Article

VL - 33

SP - 630

EP - 649

JO - The RAND Journal of Economics

JF - The RAND Journal of Economics

IS - 4

ER -