Trust is crucial in dynamic multi-agent systems, where agents may frequently join and leave, and the structure of the society may often change. In these environments, it may be difficult for agents to form stable trust relationships necessary for confident interactions. Societies may break down when trust between agents is too low to motivate interactions. In such settings, agents should make decisions about who to interact with, given their degree of trust in the available partners. We propose a decision-theoretic model of trust decision making allows controls to be used, as well as trust, to increase confidence in initial interactions. We consider explicit incentives, monitoring and reputation as examples of such controls. We evaluate our approach within a simulated, highly-dynamic multiagent environment, and show how this model supports the making of delegation decisions when trust is low.
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the Twenty Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence|
|Subtitle of host publication||Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 16-22 July 2011|
|Place of Publication||Menlo Park, California|
|Publisher||AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence|
|Number of pages||6|
|Publication status||Published - 2011|