Trusting Social Robots

Paula Sweeney

doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00165-5

Trusting Social Robots

Paula Sweeney^* (Corresponding Author)

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that we need a more robust account of our ability and willingness to trust social robots. I motivate my argument by demonstrating that existing accounts of trust and of trusting social robots are inadequate. I identify that it is the feature of a façade or deception inherent in our engagement with social robots that both facilitates, and is in danger of undermining, trust. Finally, I utilise the fictional dualism model of social robots to clarify that trust in social robots, unlike trust in humans, must rely on an independent judgement of product reliability.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	419-426
Number of pages	8
Journal	AI and Ethics
Volume	3
Issue number	2
Early online date	24 May 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00165-5
Publication status	Published - May 2023

Keywords

Artificial agents
Social robots
Trust
Fictional dualism
Reliability

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10.1007/s43681-022-00165-5Licence: CC BY

Sweeney_AIE_Trusting_Social_Robots_VoR
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Final published version, 516 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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Trusting Social Robots

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