Truth-conditions, truth-bearers and the new B-theory of time

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)325-344
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume142
Issue number3
Early online date15 Dec 2007
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2009

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B-theory
Truth Conditions
Theorists
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Rivals

Keywords

  • tense
  • B-theory
  • time

Cite this

Truth-conditions, truth-bearers and the new B-theory of time. / Torre, Stephan.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 142 , No. 3, 02.2009, p. 325-344.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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