### Abstract

I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 241-264 |

Number of pages | 24 |

Journal | Studia Logica |

Volume | 92 |

Issue number | 2 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2009 |

## Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Truth values and proof theory'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

## Cite this

Restall, G. (2009). Truth values and proof theory.

*Studia Logica*,*92*(2), 241-264. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y