TY - JOUR
T1 - Truth values and proof theory
AU - Restall, G.
PY - 2009/7/1
Y1 - 2009/7/1
N2 - I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
AB - I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349562493&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y
DO - 10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:70349562493
VL - 92
SP - 241
EP - 264
JO - Studia Logica
JF - Studia Logica
SN - 0039-3215
IS - 2
ER -