TY - JOUR

T1 - Truth values and proof theory

AU - Restall, G.

PY - 2009/7/1

Y1 - 2009/7/1

N2 - I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.

AB - I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70349562493&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y

DO - 10.1007/s11225-009-9197-y

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:70349562493

VL - 92

SP - 241

EP - 264

JO - Studia Logica

JF - Studia Logica

SN - 0039-3215

IS - 2

ER -