Truth values and proof theory

G. Restall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-264
Number of pages24
JournalStudia Logica
Volume92
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2009

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Proof Theory
Intuitionistic Logic
Classical Logic
Modal Logic
Logic
Semantics
Truth
Fundamental
Value Theory
Truth Value
Semantic Structure

Cite this

Truth values and proof theory. / Restall, G.

In: Studia Logica, Vol. 92, No. 2, 01.07.2009, p. 241-264.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Restall, G. / Truth values and proof theory. In: Studia Logica. 2009 ; Vol. 92, No. 2. pp. 241-264.
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