Unionism and peer-referencing

Georgios A. Panos, Ioannis Theodossiou

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

This study assesses the “fair-wage-effort” hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherCentre for European Labour Market Research
Number of pages55
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2010

Publication series

NameUniversity of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series
No.03
Volume2010
ISSN (Print)0143-4543

Fingerprint

Peers
Workers
Incentives
Job satisfaction
Wages
Union membership
Conformism
Relative wages
Wage determination
Industrial relations
Ranking
Payment
Tenure
Fair wages
Inequity aversion
Status-seeking
Reference point
Loss aversion
Employees

Cite this

Panos, G. A., & Theodossiou, I. (2010). Unionism and peer-referencing. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; Vol. 2010, No. 03). Centre for European Labour Market Research.

Unionism and peer-referencing. / Panos, Georgios A.; Theodossiou, Ioannis.

Centre for European Labour Market Research, 2010. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; Vol. 2010, No. 03).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Panos, GA & Theodossiou, I 2010 'Unionism and peer-referencing' University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series, no. 03, vol. 2010, Centre for European Labour Market Research.
Panos GA, Theodossiou I. Unionism and peer-referencing. Centre for European Labour Market Research. 2010 Feb. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; 03).
Panos, Georgios A. ; Theodossiou, Ioannis. / Unionism and peer-referencing. Centre for European Labour Market Research, 2010. (University of Aberdeen Business School Working Paper Series; 03).
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