Virtue epistemology and epistemic twin earth

Jesper Kallestrup*, Duncan Pritchard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

59 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A popular form of virtue epistemology - defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco - holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)335-357
Number of pages23
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Volume22
Issue number3
Early online date21 Dec 2011
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2014

Bibliographical note

This paper was written while DHP was in receipt of a Philip Leverhulme Prize. An earlier version of this paper was presented (by JK) at a workshop on epistemology at the University of Copenhagen in November 2010, and the authors are grateful to the participants at this event for helpful feedback. Thanks also to Evan Butts and Orestis Palermos.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Virtue epistemology and epistemic twin earth'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this