When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?

Patrick Bernhagen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)20-43
Number of pages24
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Research
Volume52
Issue number1
Early online date7 Jun 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013

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Keywords

  • interest groups
  • political influence
  • lobbying
  • asymmetric information
  • signalling games

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