Who to Lobby and When: Institutional Determinants of Interest Group Strategies in European Parliament Committees

David Marshall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

43 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)553-575
Number of pages23
JournalEuropean Union Politics
Volume11
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2010

Fingerprint

Lobbying
Public Opinion
European Parliament
lobby
Politics
interest group
Organizations
Interviews
determinants
amendment
voting
elite
organization
interview
evidence
Datasets

Keywords

  • committee organization
  • European Parliament
  • influence
  • lobbying

Cite this

Who to Lobby and When : Institutional Determinants of Interest Group Strategies in European Parliament Committees. / Marshall, David.

In: European Union Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 12.2010, p. 553-575.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{8e937c13ef594e098708e3a7a3ba7d8a,
title = "Who to Lobby and When: Institutional Determinants of Interest Group Strategies in European Parliament Committees",
abstract = "This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.",
keywords = "committee organization, European Parliament, influence , lobbying",
author = "David Marshall",
year = "2010",
month = "12",
doi = "10.1177/1465116510382462",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "553--575",
journal = "European Union Politics",
issn = "1465-1165",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Who to Lobby and When

T2 - Institutional Determinants of Interest Group Strategies in European Parliament Committees

AU - Marshall, David

PY - 2010/12

Y1 - 2010/12

N2 - This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.

AB - This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.

KW - committee organization

KW - European Parliament

KW - influence

KW - lobbying

U2 - 10.1177/1465116510382462

DO - 10.1177/1465116510382462

M3 - Article

VL - 11

SP - 553

EP - 575

JO - European Union Politics

JF - European Union Politics

SN - 1465-1165

IS - 4

ER -