Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports

Gerry Hough

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s challenge does not undermine the common sense justification presented in Sects. 1 and 2. I avoid the challenge by arguing that anti-substitution intuitions are not directly sensitive to the content of the sentences that produce them, but rather to the possibility that one could have distinct ways of thinking about an object.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)317-329
Number of pages13
JournalActa Analytica
Volume29
Issue number3
Early online date27 Oct 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2014

Fingerprint

Substitution
Intuition
Belief Reports
Sect
Justification
Common Sense
Philosophers of Language
Teaching
Enlightenment

Keywords

  • Frege’s puzzle
  • Propositional attitude ascriptions
  • Names
  • Anti-substitution intuitions
  • Simple sentences
  • Jennifer Saul

Cite this

Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports. / Hough, Gerry.

In: Acta Analytica, Vol. 29, No. 3, 09.2014, p. 317-329.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Hough, Gerry. / Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports. In: Acta Analytica. 2014 ; Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 317-329.
@article{63781a57aa954956b09d51ce10afe0db,
title = "Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports",
abstract = "Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s challenge does not undermine the common sense justification presented in Sects. 1 and 2. I avoid the challenge by arguing that anti-substitution intuitions are not directly sensitive to the content of the sentences that produce them, but rather to the possibility that one could have distinct ways of thinking about an object.",
keywords = "Frege’s puzzle, Propositional attitude ascriptions, Names, Anti-substitution intuitions, Simple sentences, Jennifer Saul",
author = "Gerry Hough",
note = "Thanks to David Liggins, Joe Morrison, Arash Pessian, Bob Plant, Jennifer Saul, and Crispin Wright, all of whom provided substantial and invaluable commentary on this article and related work.",
year = "2014",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1007/s12136-013-0213-5",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "317--329",
journal = "Acta Analytica",
issn = "0353-5150",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Anti-Substitution Intuitions and the Content of Belief Reports

AU - Hough, Gerry

N1 - Thanks to David Liggins, Joe Morrison, Arash Pessian, Bob Plant, Jennifer Saul, and Crispin Wright, all of whom provided substantial and invaluable commentary on this article and related work.

PY - 2014/9

Y1 - 2014/9

N2 - Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s challenge does not undermine the common sense justification presented in Sects. 1 and 2. I avoid the challenge by arguing that anti-substitution intuitions are not directly sensitive to the content of the sentences that produce them, but rather to the possibility that one could have distinct ways of thinking about an object.

AB - Philosophers of language traditionally take it that anti-substitution intuitions teach us about the content of belief reports. Jennifer Saul [1997, 2002 (with David Braun), 2007] challenges this lesson. Here I offer a response to Saul’s challenge. In the first two sections of the article, I present a common sense justification for drawing conclusions about content from anti-substitution intuitions. Then, in Sect. 3, I outline Saul’s challenge—what she calls ‘the Enlightenment Problem’. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that Saul’s challenge does not undermine the common sense justification presented in Sects. 1 and 2. I avoid the challenge by arguing that anti-substitution intuitions are not directly sensitive to the content of the sentences that produce them, but rather to the possibility that one could have distinct ways of thinking about an object.

KW - Frege’s puzzle

KW - Propositional attitude ascriptions

KW - Names

KW - Anti-substitution intuitions

KW - Simple sentences

KW - Jennifer Saul

U2 - 10.1007/s12136-013-0213-5

DO - 10.1007/s12136-013-0213-5

M3 - Article

VL - 29

SP - 317

EP - 329

JO - Acta Analytica

JF - Acta Analytica

SN - 0353-5150

IS - 3

ER -