Decision making in phantom spaces

Yehuda Izhakian, Zur Izhakian

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new model of decision making under uncertainty. Aiming to provide a more realistic depiction of decision making, it generalizes the von Neumann–Morgenstern theory by including additional tiers of uncertainty. In this model, beliefs about the probabilities of events are ambiguous and their consequential utilities are vague; both are naturally formulated in the phantom space using phantom numbers. The degree of uncertainty, determined by the decision maker’s beliefs, is distinguished from the attitude toward uncertainty, which is drawn from her preferences. Decision making under ambiguity is a particular case of our model in which probabilities are ambiguous, but resulting utilities of events are knowable.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-98
Number of pages40
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume58
Issue number1
Early online date22 Mar 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2015

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Decision making
Uncertainty
Decision maker
Decision making under uncertainty

Keywords

  • Phantom probability
  • Decision making under uncertainty
  • Expected utility
  • Imprecise risk
  • Ambiguity
  • Uncertainty
  • Ellsberg paradox

Cite this

Decision making in phantom spaces. / Izhakian, Yehuda; Izhakian, Zur.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 58, No. 1, 01.2015, p. 59-98.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Izhakian, Yehuda ; Izhakian, Zur. / Decision making in phantom spaces. In: Economic Theory. 2015 ; Vol. 58, No. 1. pp. 59-98.
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