TY - JOUR
T1 - Delegation, union leaders and capital Allocation
AU - Skåtun, John Douglas F.
N1 - Acknowledgements.
I am grateful for comments from an anonymous referee, K. Bender, P. Sloane, and I. Theodossiou. All errors are my own.
PY - 1997/7
Y1 - 1997/7
N2 - This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. Strong union members precommit by hiring a weak leader, whilst weak union members hire a strong union leader. Governments can increase the efficiency of capital by reducing the intrinsic union strength, but could reduce the efficiency of capital if intrinsic internal union leader strength is reduced.
AB - This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. Strong union members precommit by hiring a weak leader, whilst weak union members hire a strong union leader. Governments can increase the efficiency of capital by reducing the intrinsic union strength, but could reduce the efficiency of capital if intrinsic internal union leader strength is reduced.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0031394146&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1467-9914.00036
DO - 10.1111/1467-9914.00036
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031394146
VL - 11
SP - 249
EP - 264
JO - Labour
JF - Labour
SN - 1121-7081
IS - 2
ER -