Delegation, union leaders and capital Allocation

John Douglas F. Skåtun*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. Strong union members precommit by hiring a weak leader, whilst weak union members hire a strong union leader. Governments can increase the efficiency of capital by reducing the intrinsic union strength, but could reduce the efficiency of capital if intrinsic internal union leader strength is reduced.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-264
Number of pages16
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jul 1997


Dive into the research topics of 'Delegation, union leaders and capital Allocation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this