Disclosure of mergers without regulatory restrictions: Insider trading in pre-1914 Germany

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In the pre-World-War I period, lacking regulatory restrictions allowed ‘hidden' mergers however, some companies disclosed information voluntarily. I analyze insider gains by investigating the share price behavior prior to merger announcements. When companies hid information, stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns prior to newspaper reports that uncovered hidden transactions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-7
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume7
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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Company information
Insider trading
Mergers
Disclosure
Germany
Announcement
Share prices
Abnormal returns
World War I
Insider

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Disclosure of mergers without regulatory restrictions : Insider trading in pre-1914 Germany. / Kling, Gerhard.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008, p. 1-7.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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