End-of-Day Price Manipulation and M&As

Douglas Cumming; Shan JI; Sofia Johan; Monika Tarsalewska

doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12374

End-of-Day Price Manipulation and M&As

Douglas Cumming^* (Corresponding Author), Shan JI, Sofia Johan, Monika Tarsalewska

^*Corresponding author for this work

Business Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Based on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from over 45 countries from 2003 to 2014, we show that the presence of end-of-day (EOD) target price manipulation prior to M&As increases the probability of an M&A deal withdrawal, and decreases the premium paid. More detailed exchange trading rules that govern manipulation across countries and over time lower the probability of withdrawal, mitigate the negative impact of EOD manipulation on withdrawal and raise premiums paid. Finally, while there are fewer cases of acquirer price manipulations prior to M&As, the data indicates positive acquirer price manipulation in share M&As and increases the probability of deal withdrawal.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	184-205
Number of pages	22
Journal	British Journal of Management
Volume	31
Issue number	1
Early online date	28 Jun 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12374
Publication status	Published - Jan 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information
Social Sciences Research Humanities Council of Canada
European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. Grant Number: 665778
National Science Centre, Poland. Grant Number: 2016/23/P/HS4/04032 POLONEZ

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End-of-Day Price Manipulation and M&As

Abstract

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