Skepticism and epistemic closure: two Bayesian accounts

Luca Moretti* (Corresponding Author), Tomoji Shogenji

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
18 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-25
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Volume7
Issue number1
Early online date17 Apr 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2017

Keywords

  • skepticism
  • epistemic closure
  • Bayesianism
  • epistemic justification
  • Linda case

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