Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-25 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | International Journal for the Study of Skepticism |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | May 2016 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |
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Keywords
- skepticism
- epistemic closure
- Bayesianism
- epistemic justification
- Linda case
Cite this
Skepticism and epistemic closure : two Bayesian accounts. / Moretti, Luca; Shogenji, Tomoji.
In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2017, p. 1-25.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Skepticism and epistemic closure
T2 - two Bayesian accounts
AU - Moretti, Luca
AU - Shogenji, Tomoji
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.
AB - This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.
KW - skepticism
KW - epistemic closure
KW - Bayesianism
KW - epistemic justification
KW - Linda case
U2 - 10.1163/22105700-006011213
DO - 10.1163/22105700-006011213
M3 - Article
VL - 7
SP - 1
EP - 25
JO - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
JF - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
SN - 2210-5697
IS - 1
ER -