Some Comments on Free-Riding in Leontief Partnerships

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Holmstrom (Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 1982, 324-40) showed that free-riding is inevitable in partnerships where inputs are substitutes. Legros and Matthews (Review of Economic Studies, 68, 1993, 599-611) and Vislie (Journal of Economics Behavior anti Organization 23, 1994, 83-91) showed that when inputs are strict complements (Leontief technology), free-riding can be avoided with a linear sharing rule. This paper considers the robustness and some extensions of the positive result of these articles. First, I show that Legros and Matthews's and Vislie's results are not robust to the introduction of participation constraints and limited liability. However; I construct a novel rule that mitigates that problem. Second, I perturb the (deterministic) model of the other authors. It turns out that free-riding is avoidable with noise added to joint output and is inevitable when noise is added to individual productivity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)467-473
Number of pages6
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume39
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2001

Keywords

  • COORDINATION FAILURE
  • MORAL HAZARD
  • EFFICIENCY
  • TEAMS
  • ORGANIZATION
  • UNCERTAINTY

Cite this

Some Comments on Free-Riding in Leontief Partnerships. / Hvide, Hans Krogh.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 39, No. 3, 07.2001, p. 467-473.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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