Take Some Days Off Why Don't You?: Endogenous Sick leave and Pay

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This is a model of endogenous sick leave in the presence of endemic infectious diseases. The prevalence rate elasticity with respect to sick leave is unity, when workers are paid their marginal product, and firms profit maximise. Full information contracts yield a compensating higher wage to the sick than to the healthy workers. Sick leave pay is greater than the healthy working wage. The contracted sick leave period falls with: the external disease transmission, the productivity of the ill, the discomfort when ill on sick leave and reductions in the work discomfort of the ill. Full insurance breaks down under asymmetric information, where implicit contract firms may offer more sick leave than profit maximising firms with the same payment schedule. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)379-402
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume22
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2003

Keywords

  • endogenous
  • illness
  • absenteeism
  • ABSENTEEISM
  • DISEASE
  • WORK
  • INSURANCE
  • HEALTH
  • MODEL
  • WAGES
  • COSTS

Cite this

Take Some Days Off Why Don't You?: Endogenous Sick leave and Pay. / Skatun, John Douglas Fordyce.

In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 22, No. 3, 05.2003, p. 379-402.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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