Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 967-984 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Terrorism and Political Violence |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| Early online date | 4 Nov 2015 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |
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Keywords
- European Union
- Europol
- international security
- International Relations (IR)
- data protection
Cite this
The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third countries: Data protection and power asymmetry. / Anagnostakis, Dimitrios; Kaunert, Christian (Corresponding Author); Ilbiz, Ethem.
In: Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 29, No. 6, 2017, p. 967-984.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third countries:
T2 - Data protection and power asymmetry
AU - Anagnostakis, Dimitrios
AU - Kaunert, Christian
AU - Ilbiz, Ethem
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - This article investigates empirically the impact of power asymmetry and interest formation in the European Union’s (EU) external relations with third countries in the context of the Europol data exchange and counterterrorism agreements. It focuses on three countries, namely the United States, Turkey, and Morocco, which each have a different level of counterterrorism cooperation with the EU. This article argues that the EU acts as a pragmatic actor with regard to Europol’s data exchange agreements with third countries, and that the power asymmetry between the EU and the third country under question determines the extent of the EU’s flexibility. If the power asymmetry favours the EU, then it insists on its data protection demands. Otherwise, the EU is more flexible towards its counterparts on data protection issues.
AB - This article investigates empirically the impact of power asymmetry and interest formation in the European Union’s (EU) external relations with third countries in the context of the Europol data exchange and counterterrorism agreements. It focuses on three countries, namely the United States, Turkey, and Morocco, which each have a different level of counterterrorism cooperation with the EU. This article argues that the EU acts as a pragmatic actor with regard to Europol’s data exchange agreements with third countries, and that the power asymmetry between the EU and the third country under question determines the extent of the EU’s flexibility. If the power asymmetry favours the EU, then it insists on its data protection demands. Otherwise, the EU is more flexible towards its counterparts on data protection issues.
KW - European Union
KW - Europol
KW - international security
KW - International Relations (IR)
KW - data protection
U2 - 10.1080/09546553.2015.1092438
DO - 10.1080/09546553.2015.1092438
M3 - Article
VL - 29
SP - 967
EP - 984
JO - Terrorism and Political Violence
JF - Terrorism and Political Violence
SN - 0954-6553
IS - 6
ER -