The End(s) of Philosophy

Robert Christopher Plant

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for’. The desire for such conceptual tranquillity is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work, and especially in his later ‘grammatical-therapeutic’ philosophy. Some commentators (notably Rush Rhees and C. G. Luckhardt) have cautioned that emphasising this facet of Wittgenstein's work ‘trivialises’ philosophy – something which is at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical ‘seriousness’ (in particular his insistence that philosophy demands that one ‘Go the bloody hard way’). Drawing on a number of correlations between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and that of the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, in this paper I defend a strong ‘therapeutic’ reading of Wittgenstein, and show how this can be maintained without ‘trivialising’ philosophy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)222-257
Number of pages35
JournalPhilosophical Investigations
Volume27
Issue number3
Early online date9 Jun 2004
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2004

Cite this

The End(s) of Philosophy. / Plant, Robert Christopher.

In: Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 27, No. 3, 07.2004, p. 222-257.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Plant, Robert Christopher. / The End(s) of Philosophy. In: Philosophical Investigations. 2004 ; Vol. 27, No. 3. pp. 222-257.
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