Transactions That Did Not Happen and Their Influence on Prices

A. Kirman, Rainer Schulz, W. Hardle, A. Werwatz

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    13 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. We have details of counter offers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. We analyse the evolution of prices and the relation between the final price struck and the proposals of the two parties. Periods with no buyer refusals, of offers or bargaining with no transaction will lead to a revision of the seller's first price. More importantly the sharing of the surplus moves in the buyer's favour during the day. These theoretical predictions are confirmed by our data set. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)567-591
    Number of pages24
    JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
    Volume56
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2005

    Keywords

    • bargaining
    • markets
    • INFORMATION
    • MARKET
    • MODEL

    Cite this

    Transactions That Did Not Happen and Their Influence on Prices. / Kirman, A.; Schulz, Rainer; Hardle, W.; Werwatz, A.

    In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 56, No. 4, 04.2005, p. 567-591.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Kirman, A. ; Schulz, Rainer ; Hardle, W. ; Werwatz, A. / Transactions That Did Not Happen and Their Influence on Prices. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2005 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 567-591.
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