Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost

Toby Meadows

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690–716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663–681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)221-240
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume42
Issue number2
Early online date6 Jan 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2013

Fingerprint

Logic
Supervaluation
Ghost
Theory of Truth
Semantic Paradoxes
Logicians
Justification
Repair

Keywords

  • truth
  • semantic truth definition
  • dependence
  • supervaluation
  • Leitgeb
  • Kripke
  • revision theory of truth

Cite this

Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation : Living with the Ghost. / Meadows, Toby.

In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 42, No. 2, 04.2013, p. 221-240.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Meadows, Toby. / Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation : Living with the Ghost. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. 2013 ; Vol. 42, No. 2. pp. 221-240.
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