Abstract
Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent's cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 867-890 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Nous |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 10 May 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Thanks to Gloria Andrada, Emma C. Gordon, Mark Sprevak, Mona Simion, Thor Grunbaum, Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen and three anonymous referees at Noˆus. The authors are also grateful to collaborators on the AHRC Extended Knowledge project for helpful discussion, including Andy Clark, Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard.Fingerprint
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Jesper Kallestrup
- School of Divinity, History & Philosophy, Philosophy - Chair in Philosophy, Professor of philosophy
Person: Academic